An unusual, bipartisan coalition of House members voted to pass the Faster Labor Contracts Act (FLCA), a law that would impose fast-track bargaining schedules for initial contracts and could end in having government arbitrators impose two-year contracts on the parties.
What the FLCA Does
The FLCA would change the current open-ended bargaining and replace it with an accelerated bargaining timeline and a mandatory process that can result in the imposition of first-contract terms. Under the terms of the highly controversial bill, bargaining would have to begin within 10 days of a union’s written demand. If the parties haven’t reached agreement within 90 days, either party—but more likely the union—could request the involvement of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). This, in turn, would initiate 30 days of mediation. If that doesn’t produce an agreement, the dispute would proceed to binding interest arbitration, and the resulting first-contract terms would bind the employer for two years.
Twenty Republicans joined with Democrats to pass the bill as part of a party initiative to sway blue-collar workers with union sympathies. The FLCA now heads to the Senate, where it will meet fierce opposition despite being supported by Republican Senators Josh Hawley (MO), Roger Marshall (KS), and Bernie Moreno (OH), as well as by a surprisingly small cadre of Democrats.
Zealous opposition from business community
The bill has met impassioned opposition from the business community. The arguments range from the sublime (a “taking” in violation of the Constitution) to the practical (imposing terms that neither party wants). At the core of management’s objections is having the collective bargaining process removed from the parties’ control.
The other main objections are easily identified:
- The timelines are unrealistic. Neither labor nor management can understand and respond to proposals in a first-contract context in the abbreviated periods.
- The parties most affected and who will have to live with the contract aren’t the final deciders. The workers lose the right to ratify, and despite the best efforts of the interest arbitrators, a “bad” contract could force a business into distress or worse.
- Outside arbitrators can never fully represent or articulate the interests of the parties involved. The prospect of unrealistic or unachievable terms is feared.
- There’s no means for either party to challenge the imposed contract.
- By removing the give-and-take of negotiations—including attenuating the process by either party—the “leverage” between the parties is fundamentally altered.
Voluntary core of U.S. labor law at risk
The core of American labor law is the participation of unions and managers in a voluntary process. The workers must first decide to join a union and then must vote in a (usually) contested election. Only then can the parties collectively bargain to arrive at a contract both can live with, accepted by a vote of the union members. Along the way, boundaries created by statute are designed to keep the process from disintegrating in rancor.
The new law largely reflects frustration on the part of some in the labor movement who believe management has too much leverage, too many opportunities to lengthen the bargaining and delay arriving at a contract. However plausible that argument may be, many have voiced concerns about having the government directly impose labor contract terms. A Senate vote on the FLCA hasn’t been scheduled yet.